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M
any of the origins of the recent financial crisis were in the 
United  States,  beginning  with  subprime  mortgages  and 
mortgage securities. As the crisis spread globally, few market 
participants or regulatory authorities saw it coming, and all underesti-
mated its severity.
In the United States, the crisis has sparked many proposals to ad-
dress its perceived causes and prevent a recurrence. Proposals include 
establishing a systemic regulator, enhancing financial institution super-
vision and resolution authorities, creating a consumer financial protec-
tion agency, and many others. 
One approach already used in many other countries is publishing fi-
nancial stability reports (FSRs). These reports review the condition of the 
financial system, identify and assess risks to the system, and suggest mar-
ket or policy changes to address significant risk concerns. They are usually 
prepared by the country’s central bank and appear on a regular basis. 
Jim Wilkinson is an assistant vice president and economist, Kenneth Spong is a senior 
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The primary goal of an FSR is to promote financial stability. It   
attempts to achieve its purpose by providing insights that allow the cen-
tral bank, other financial supervisors, and market participants to better 
anticipate systemic problems and design effective policy responses. 
The recent financial crisis provides an opportunity to assess the   
effectiveness of these reports. This article analyzes the FSRs prepared by 
four European countries that were affected by the financial crisis—the 
United Kingdom, Sweden, the Netherlands, and Spain. We examine 
whether the reports gave the central bankers and others useful informa-
tion before and during the crisis. 
The analysis finds that these four FSRs were generally successful in 
identifying the risks that played important roles in the crisis—although 
they underestimated its severity. While it is not clear that FSRs helped 
to reduce the damages, it would be a mistake to dismiss them as a use-
ful tool. Overall, publishing FSRs appears to be a worthwhile exercise 
that encourages central banks and international authorities to identify 
and monitor important financial trends and emerging risks and to de-
velop a better understanding of the underlying structure of domestic 
and global financial markets.
The first section of the article describes the benefits of FSRs and 
their general characteristics. The second section gives a brief overview 
of the financial crisis. The following section discusses the FSRs of the 
UK, Sweden, the Netherlands, and Spain. These discussions highlight 
the unique aspects of the crisis in each country and the risks identified 
by the FSRs, followed by an evaluation of their effectiveness. 
I.  FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORTS
Financial stability reports have become an increasingly important 
tool for promoting stability. One study notes that in 2005 almost 50 
central banks published an FSR (Čihák).1 The United States is the only 
major industrialized country that does not publish one, although the 
Federal Reserve and other regulatory authorities have regular surveil-
lance and monitoring programs.2 This section describes FSRs and dis-
cusses their potential for promoting financial stability. Next, it describes 
the characteristics and general structure of FSRs and how they measure 
and assess risk to the financial system.ECONOMIC REVIEW • FIRST QUARTER 2010  43
Financial stability reports
Financial stability can be difficult to define and has been used to 
describe a wide range of conditions. Financial stability can refer to the 
absence of a financial crisis or the “smooth functioning of the key ele-
ments that make up the financial system.”3 Alternatively, it can apply to 
financial systems that are robust and able to withstand various shocks 
or risk exposures. One of the Bank of England’s (BOE) 2009 FSRs 
state that a “stable financial system is able to sustain critical services to 
the wider economy—payments, credit provision and insurance against 
risk—even when it is hit by unanticipated events.”4 This definition of 
financial stability, which includes resistance to shocks, has been widely 
adopted by writers of financial stability reports.5 Given this definition, 
an FSR should look for risks and shocks that are large enough to inter-
rupt the smooth functioning of the financial system. 
Potential benefits of FSRs
FSRs can promote stability by providing information that allows 
the  central  bank,  other  regulatory  authorities,  and  market  partici-
pants to understand the risks and potential problems that threaten the 
smooth functioning of the financial system. With timely information, 
regulatory authorities and market participants may be able to take ac-
tions to address such threats before they cause problems. This informa-
tion may also be useful in understanding and developing appropriate 
policy responses in the midst of a crisis. 
An FSR can help promote financial stability by bringing a systemic 
focus to risk management. While market participants may be aware of 
risks at an individual or micro level, they may fail to see the build-up 
or the effect of risk taking at a broader level across the entire financial 
system.6 This need for a more comprehensive view of risk exposure can 
be addressed if an FSR helps identify systemwide threats to financial 
stability and gives policymakers and supervisory authorities the insights 
needed to improve the financial infrastructure. 
Publishing an FSR for public consumption on a regular basis also 
has advantages. Central banks undertake a wide range of surveillance 
activities, not all of which are suitable for public distribution.7 How-
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of its activities and concerns. Market participants that follow an FSR’s 
results over time may be better able to interpret and respond to the 
results. Finally, having an FSR reviewed by the public and market par-
ticipants should increase accountability and encourage the central bank 
to be more careful, accurate, and precise in preparing its reports. These 
factors should enhance the credibility of an FSR over time.
In short, an FSR may improve communication and cooperation 
between regulatory authorities and market participants and among 
regulatory authorities within or across nations. An FSR may help mar-
ket participants better understand and respond to the concerns of their 
regulatory authorities. An FSR may identify common risks and threats 
to financial institutions supervised by authorities outside the central 
bank or by different regulators within a country. And, by providing a 
better understanding of common risks in different countries, an FSR 
may help the countries’ regulatory authorities cooperate more effec-
tively if the risks are realized. 
Characteristics of FSRs
In writing FSRs, central banks must decide what information,   
aspects of financial markets, and mode of analysis will provide the clear-
est assessment of financial stability within a country. An FSR is usually 
forward–looking: It tries to identify and evaluate potential future prob-
lems that can impair stability. FSRs generally have a systemic focus. 
While it is necessary and important to evaluate individual institutions 
on a supervisory level, an FSR needs to assess risks to the financial sys-
tem as a whole. Problems at individual institutions are important to the 
extent that they may create instability at the system level. 
An FSR strives to identify and assess significant risks to a country’s 
financial system. These sources of risk can generally be divided into three 
broad categories—macroeconomic conditions or sectoral imbalances; fi-
nancial sector risks; and external or international sources of risk. 
Weaknesses in a country’s macroeconomy pose a myriad of risks for 
the financial system. In this regard, an economic recession can lead to 
an increase in loan defaults and bond downgrades that may affect the 
solvency of financial institutions and, in turn, the overall functioning 
of the financial system. Sectoral imbalances refer to potential prob-
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the financial sector. Examples include the build-up of excessive levels of 
debt or leverage in the household or corporate sectors, which could lead 
to stresses and defaults that would impair financial stability.
Financial sector risks can stem from problems at individual firms, 
common practices or exposures at financial institutions, financial mar-
ket conditions, and weaknesses in the financial infrastructure. Failure or 
significant distress at a large financial firm can cause problems at other 
financial firms if the firms are counterparties with large exposures to the 
distressed firm. Problems at smaller institutions might have systemic 
effects if the problems are common to many firms. For example, in the 
recent crisis, many institutions held complex and illiquid mortgage-re-
lated securities that incurred large losses as the crisis unfolded. Volatile 
market conditions and asset price bubbles can further lead to financial 
instability. The financial infrastructure includes the payments systems, 
trade clearing and settlement systems, risk management systems of mar-
ket participants, and the regulatory oversight system. Weaknesses in the 
financial infrastructure can result in disruptions of payments and finan-
cial flows or losses due to risks that could have been managed or avoided.
External or international exposures can also have a significant ef-
fect on financial stability. With increasingly connected, global financial 
markets, problems in one country can now be transmitted quickly to 
other countries. Furthermore, large financial institutions often operate 
in several countries, so the failure of one of these institutions can affect 
financial conditions in each of the countries where it has operations.
FSRs typically assess each significant risk that might arise from the 
categories above and evaluate whether the risk is increasing and likely to 
be realized. This assessment usually includes the potential effect on the 
financial system if the risk is realized.
There are a number of approaches that an FSR can take to identify 
and assess risks. One approach is to use common financial indicators 
and ratios, based on currently reported data. The IMF has suggested 
a list of financial soundness indicators designed to assess the financial 
health of a country’s banking system, nonbank financial intermediaries, 
and the nonfinancial sectors of the economy (Sundararajan and others). 
They include indicators such as capital-to-asset ratios, liquid-assets-to-
short-term-liability ratios, and return on assets for financial institutions; 
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ratios for nonfinancial corporations. 8 These indicators can provide use-
ful information about the present state of the financial system. But they 
may be less helpful in evaluating future conditions and risks. 
To provide a forward–looking perspective, an FSR can also look at 
market-based indicators. For example, spreads on credit default swaps 
provide a market assessment of the creditworthiness of individual firms 
or sectors of the market. Other market-based indicators include stock 
prices, stock index values, and interest rate spreads on subordinated 
debt issued by financial institutions. Market-based indicators give a 
forward–looking perspective, reflecting the views of many highly mo-
tivated market participants. Compared to common financial indicators 
and ratios, market-based indicators are more timely because they are 
based on investor expectations rather than on accounting data that may 
be dated. 
An FSR may also identify risk based on qualitative indicators and 
analysis. Many central banks have access to supervisory evaluations or 
other qualitative indicators. More generally, reports must rely on the 
insights and analysis of those preparing the report and their expertise in 
detecting risks and assessing threats to financial stability.
In addition to identifying potential threats to financial stability, an 
FSR typically assesses the likelihood and severity of the risks—and how 
risks may be changing over time. The assessment may be based on an 
analysis of financial or market indicators or on a subjective analysis pre-
pared by the report’s authors. An FSR can use stress testing and scenario 
analysis to estimate how the conditions of financial firms or sectors 
might change given a specified change in market or economic condi-
tions. Stress tests and scenario analysis rely on mathematical models or 
computer simulations to estimate the effects of a significant change in 
economic or market conditions on financial institutions. For example, 
a central bank might try to model the effects of a large increase in inter-
est rates on the banking system’s capital and earnings. The usefulness 
of these techniques depends on the types of scenarios that are run and 
whether the underlying model of the financial system is realistic.
Each approach to identify and assess risk has its own strengths and 
weaknesses. For a thorough evaluation of each risk, an FSR should base 
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Risk evaluations and assessments require an extensive amount of 
information and data. Most countries regularly collect data on the con-
dition of financial firms and debt levels of the household and business 
sectors. Some central banks collect additional data or undertake special 
surveys to get additional information. For example, the Sveriges Riks-
bank, the Swedish central bank, conducts a quarterly survey of counter-
party exposures at Sweden’s largest banks, thus providing a good indica-
tion of how problems at one institution might affect others. Regular 
data collection is also important during a financial crisis because it pro-
vides transparency, can guide policy actions, and helps reduce the type 
of uncertainty that could lead to a loss of public confidence.
II.  CRISIS OVERVIEW
Before reviewing FSRs to assess their ability to anticipate and help 
react to the recent financial crisis, this section briefly reviews the sig-
nificant factors and risks that led up to the crisis. Ideally, an FSR would 
have identified these factors in the early stages of the crisis. This over-
view looks at how the crisis began and spread globally.
While a wide variety of factors contributed to the recent financial 
crisis, the most common element was a substantial underestimation of 
the inherent risks in many financial activities. Leading up to the cri-
sis, a long period of prosperity, low inflation, and low interest rates 
in most major countries contributed to a highly optimistic economic 
environment—one characterized by historically low credit risk spreads 
on financial instruments, rapid credit expansion, and large increases in 
housing prices. High public and private savings rates in Asian countries 
also helped keep interest rates low and provided funds to finance rising 
debt levels in other countries.
Within financial markets, a number of developments and innova-
tions led to a more fragile and vulnerable system. These included lax 
lending standards, misaligned incentives in the securitization process 
for mortgages and other debt instruments, and an over-reliance on 
ratings agencies. Other significant factors were the growth of highly 
complex and opaque financial instruments, increased use of short-term 
funding to finance long-term assets, a wide array of counterparty expo-
sures among financial institutions, and risk management practices and 
models that were less effective than many had anticipated.48  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
The initial impetus to the financial crisis was rapidly declining house 
prices  in  the  United  States. This  trend  led  to  significant  repayment   
problems  and  rising  foreclosures  in  subprime  real  estate  markets   
beginning in 2007. Through a variety of channels, problems spread to   
other parts of U.S. financial markets, particularly as the crisis deepened 
in the fall of 2008. Subprime mortgage-backed securities had been in-
corporated into a wide variety of complex financial instruments. Rapidly   
declining values of subprime securities cast doubt on the value of other 
financial instruments and on the condition of institutions that held them.
These problems also spread to other major countries and foreign 
institutions through their holdings of U.S. financial instruments and 
through comparable trends in their own mortgage and credit markets. 
Declining asset values, in turn, led to further liquidity, capital, and 
public confidence problems—both in the United States and abroad. 
Other related events included trading breakdowns in certain markets, 
bailouts and failures of major institutions, deterioration in interbank 
markets, and serious liquidity issues associated with the excessive de-
pendence on short-term funding. All of these financial problems result-
ed in more general economic problems. As economic activity declined, 
lenders became less willing or able to extend credit, causing economic 
activity to decline further. Unemployment increased in many countries 
as GDP decreased, leading to a drop-off in international trade and the 
start of a global recession.
These patterns of the financial crisis affected countries in different 
ways. The United States and a number of other countries, including 
the UK, were at the center of the crisis due to a combination of liberal 
lending standards, significant collapses in their housing markets, and 
their banks’ reliance on complex instruments. Other countries, such as 
the Netherlands, were affected early in the crisis due to losses on com-
plex securities and related liquidity problems. Many of the remaining 
countries, including Sweden and Spain, have avoided these more direct 
effects but suffered from the global recession, decreased international 
trade, and the decline in global liquidity. These differences may be re-
flected in the type of risks that the UK, Sweden, the Netherlands, and 
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III.  REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORTS
Central banks take a number of different approaches in analyzing 
market sectors, entities, and events. Differences include the informa-
tion that is collected and any special stress tests used in assessing finan-
cial stability. This section reviews the FSRs of four countries from 2006 
to 2009 and evaluates their effectiveness in identifying the risks that 
contributed to the financial crisis. The UK, Sweden, the Netherlands, 
and Spain all have considerable experience in preparing FSRs and thus 
provide good models for examining these reports. In addition, each 
country published reports leading up to and throughout the financial 
crisis and was affected by the crisis either directly or by the resulting 
global liquidity and economic problems. 
The UK: The Bank of England’s Financial Stability Report
In many respects, conditions in UK financial markets leading up to 
the crisis mirrored those in the United States. The country had a boom-
ing housing market, lax residential lending standards, substantial hold-
ings of complex and opaque securities and derivatives, highly leveraged 
financial institutions, and a heavy reliance on short-term financing. 
As the crisis unfolded, these conditions caused significant losses at 
many UK financial institutions. Credit concerns led to funding problems 
for Northern Rock, one of the largest mortgage lenders, causing it to seek 
liquidity support from the Bank of England and become nationalized 
in February 2008. In the third quarter of 2008, credit and interbank 
markets came close to freezing up, and asset and equity prices fell sharply, 
leading to the failure of several other UK financial firms. In September 
2008, Lloyds TSB acquired the failing HBOS, the largest UK mortgage 
lender. Bradford & Bingley, a building society, was partly nationalized 
and partly sold to Abbey Bank, a subsidiary of the Spanish bank Santand-
er. The Royal Bank of Scotland was effectively nationalized in October 
2008 as the UK Treasury took a majority stake in the company. 
UK banking problems also affected the underlying economy. Bank 
losses led to a decline in lending to the household and corporate sectors, 
contributing to slower growth and higher unemployment. This caused 
further home price depreciation, debt service stress, and personal insol-
vencies, which put additional pressure on bank balance sheets.50  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
Risk identification. The Bank of England’s FSRs identified many of 
the risks that later would play a role in the financial crisis. The 2006 
report noted potential problems in low risk premiums for financial in-
struments, which might indicate inflated asset prices. Also noted were 
large trade imbalances between countries and the risk that these im-
balances might unwind in a disorderly manner. The report cited risks 
from growing leverage in the corporate sector, highly indebted house-
holds, potential infrastructure disruptions, and growth in large complex 
financial institutions and their rising interconnectivity. The 2006 FSR 
also suggested that potential problems could be systemically amplified 
by various factors, such as illiquid instruments triggering a downward 
spiral in prices, increased dependence on wholesale funding, and grow-
ing interconnectivity of institutions. Later reports discussed additional 
risks, including potential problems in wholesale markets and concerns 
over the valuation of complex assets. Except for trade imbalances, risks 
noted in the reports were all realized during the crisis.
The risks identified in the FSRs were the product of the Bank of 
England’s Financial Stability group. The analysis relied on extensive use 
of market data, vendor data, and regulatory data to evaluate trends, 
developments, and risks in the financial system. For example, the FSRs 
kept track of counterparty exposures among the largest financial institu-
tions, including their off-balance sheet exposures. In addition, the FSRs 
conducted several market surveys, a few of which were instigated dur-
ing the crisis, such as the credit conditions survey and the systemic risk 
survey.
Risk evaluation. The evaluation of these risks was based on an analy-
sis of the information used to identify the risks and systemic stress testing 
of the resilience of UK banks (Box 1). The stress tests generally showed 
that each individual risk would not significantly reduce the capital base 
of UK institutions. However, the reports cautioned that more than one 
risk could be triggered and amplified during a severe negative shock. As 
the initial phase of the crisis broke out, the FSRs noted shortfalls in the 
quantification of the interaction between market liquidity and funding. 
Assessing the likelihood and severity of identified risks can be chal-
lenging. One report noted: “It is much harder to judge the level of 
threats than to assess how they are evolving.”9 The UK’s FSRs clearly 
underestimated the potential problems they identified. As subprime is-ECONOMIC REVIEW • FIRST QUARTER 2010  51
BOX 1
STRESS TESTING
Stress tests or scenario analyses—the terms are used inter-
changeably—are computer simulations that assess the effects of 
one or more large risks or shocks on the financial system. Stress 
tests are used to identify the types and sizes of risks that can cre-
ate instability in the financial system. The FSRs from the UK, 
Sweden, the Netherlands, and Spain use stress testing to assess 
the impact of various risks to their financial systems. This section 
explains how stress tests are conducted using an example from 
the Bank of England’s 2006 FSR. (Haldane, Hall and Pezzini). 
Stress testing requires four steps:  describe the risk to be mod-
eled; design a stress scenario that incorporates the risk; model 
how the risk is transmitted to the financial system; and estimate 
the impact on the financial system. 
While the BOE identified several risks to be modeled, this 
example will look at the risk related to household debt levels. 
Rising debt relative to household income could lead to higher 
defaults and lower household credit capacity, especially if eco-
nomic conditions deteriorate.
The BOE designed a moderate and a severe stress scenario to 
assess the household debt risk. The severe scenario was based on 
economic conditions during the UK’s early 1990s recession. The 
severe scenario assumed that GDP for the year would decline 
by 1.4 percent, unemployment would rise to 10 percent, and 
housing prices would fall by 23 percent. This was judged a large 
enough shock so as to be unlikely but still plausible.
The BOE next modeled how these scenario shocks would af-
fect banks and the financial system. The scenarios were assumed 
to affect credit risk, earnings risk and funding risks for banks. 
Declining  economic  conditions  increased  banks’  credit  risk 
through higher write-offs on consumer loans. Lower GDP and 
higher unemployment make households more likely to default, 
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Larger write-offs would reduce bank earnings and capital. Fur-
thermore, earnings risk would grow because higher defaults and 
declining credit capacity would reduce loan balances and, thus, 
interest income and fee income. Finally, funding risk would be 
higher because lower bank earnings and capital cause creditors 
to demand higher rates on bank debts, which would increase 
funding costs.
The BOE used computer simulations to estimate the impact 
that the stress test scenarios have on the banking and financial 
systems’ resiliency. The mathematical relationships in the stress 
test can become quite complex, especially when incorporating 
the macroeconomic effects. The BOE and other central banks 
use macroeconomic forecasting models that enable the econom-
ic variables in the model to change and evolve in a reasonable 
and consistent manner.
The impact of the stress scenarios on banks is shown through 
key financial ratios or measures. The BOE results are shown as a 
change from an expected or base case scenario. In assessing risks 
from rising household debt under the severe scenario, the stress 
test found that aggregate bank income fell by £25 billion, or 16 
percent of regulatory (Tier 1) capital. In some FSRs, the results 
include a range of values to reflect the uncertainty or imprecision 
in the estimates or the range of individual bank changes.
Reasonable and robust stress testing is very difficult to do. 
Good scenario design requires careful thought and analysis. The 
mathematical relationships in the model can be difficult to esti-
mate and calibrate, especially when there are a variety of indirect 
effects with important consequences. However, stress testing can 
be the best method for understanding the impact of risks that 
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sues were surfacing in the United States and mortgage securities were 
being downgraded, the FSRs concluded that the U.S. subprime mar-
ket was too small to have any systemic effect on the UK. The reports, 
though, suggested that subprime problems could potentially spill over 
to a loss of confidence in credit quality, which could affect the mar-
ket for other structured securities. The April 2008 FSR reported that 
markets most likely had overreacted, allowing asset prices to fall too 
far. Although cautioning about further additional declines, the reports 
thought the most probable outcome would be a recovery. In fact, the 
crisis became significantly worse in September 2008.
Sweden: The Sveriges Riksbank’s Financial Stability Report
The Swedish financial system largely escaped the initial phase of 
the current financial crisis and the housing collapses that occurred in 
a number of other countries. While house prices in Sweden more than 
doubled between 1995 and 2007, they have fallen only about 8 percent 
since then.10
After the financial crisis worsened in the fall of 2008, however, 
Swedish banks began to have trouble obtaining longer maturity fund-
ing, which significantly increased funding costs. In response, Swedish 
authorities took a series of steps to ease liquidity problems, including 
state guarantees of bank liabilities and increased issuance of treasury 
bills by the National Debt Office. The Sveriges Riksbank provided li-
quidity assistance to banks, cut the central bank repo rate from 4.75 
percent in September 2008 to 0.25 percent in July 2009, and entered 
into currency swaps with other central banks. Even with these actions, 
the Swedish economy slowed substantially as corporate bankruptcies, 
business debt problems, and unemployment all increased in response to 
a worsening global economy.
Risk identification. Several of the FSRs issued before the crisis identi-
fied concerns that later became important factors in the financial crisis. 
Historically low credit spreads and risk premiums were mentioned in 
the 2006 reports, which suggested that investors were turning to riskier 
assets to obtain higher yields, but without insisting on sufficient com-
pensation for the risks. The reports also stated that an abrupt change in 
expectations and desire for more secure investments could lead to mar-
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early as 2006, the reports cited concerns that the rapid growth of credit 
derivatives and hedge funds could allow disruptions to spread quickly 
from one market to another.
All of the FSRs from 2006 to 2009 suggested that the large credit 
exposures of several Swedish banks in the Baltic States posed a risk. The 
reports warned that a slowdown in the rapid economic growth and credit 
expansion in the Baltics might lead to large loan losses. With most of 
this lending denominated in euros, the reports mentioned an exchange 
rate risk in these loans. The second report in 2008 noted a more abrupt 
slowdown in the Baltic States than was previously expected.
As the financial crisis deepened, the FSRs identified a number of 
other risks, particularly concerning liquidity and credit quality. The 
risks were tied to the turbulence in foreign financial markets, sharp 
increases in short-term wholesale funding costs, and a fall in the value 
of some assets at Swedish banks. Other factors were a significant de-
pendence of Swedish banks on international wholesale funding and 
sharp increases in corporate lending, including lending to property 
companies at seemingly small margins. Soon, rising unemployment, 
deterioration in the financial condition of companies, rising corporate 
bankruptcies, falling housing and property prices, and substantial GDP 
declines in the Baltic countries were also cited as signs of worsening 
economic conditions and increasing financial risk.
Risk evaluation. To evaluate how the credit, liquidity, and contagion 
risks would affect the largest Swedish banks, the Riksbank conducted 
a number of stress tests on the country’s four largest banks, as well as a 
household debt stress test. The tests were repeated throughout the fi-
nancial crisis to gauge the resilience of banks as the crisis worsened. The 
credit quality tests were divided into several scenarios: 1) a substantial 
deterioration in creditworthiness in the Baltic countries; 2) impaired 
credit quality such as occurred during the 2000 downturn; and 3) a 
more severe credit test, which was added in the second 2008 report 
and was patterned after the Swedish property crisis of the early 1990s.11 
Generally, these tests found the largest Swedish banks would be able to 
cope with such developments. The test results, though, showed a de-
cline in the banks’ overall financial strength as the crisis worsened until 
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The Riksbank conducted several contagion and liquidity stress tests 
during the crisis as questions arose about the condition of counterpar-
ties and as funding markets collapsed. The Riksbank’s contagion stress 
tests used quarterly data collected from the major Swedish banks on 
their 15 largest counterparty exposures to estimate what would happen 
if one of the counterparties collapsed (Box 2). These tests found that 
the contagion risk was moderate and declined throughout much of the 
crisis due to government guarantees and reduced interbank exposures. 
To test for liquidity stress, the Riksbank estimated how bank operating 
profits would be affected by higher funding costs. The tests found that 
profitability would decline, but not critically. Based on the stress tests 
and other factors, the latest report issued by the Riksbank views any re-
covery as likely to be slow and still vulnerable to new shocks. The FSRs 
provided a reasonable and generally accurate assessment of how these 
risks would affect the profitability, capital, and resiliency of the four 
largest banks, although the reports did not fully anticipate the depth and 
nature of the liquidity crisis in the Swedish financial system.
BOX 2 
COUNTERPARTY RISK REPORTS IN SWEDEN
An important financial stability concern in Sweden is coun-
terparty risk, especially since much of Swedish banking is con-
centrated  in  four  large  banks.  As  a  result,  mutual  exposures 
among these banks can be substantial and could pose a contagion 
or systemic risk if one bank failed. 
The Riksbank and its Financial Stability Department have 
collected data since June 1999 on counterparty exposures at each 
of the four major banks. Banks report on both on– and off–bal-
ance sheet exposures to each of their 15 largest counterparties 
at the end of each quarter. Banks report their gross exposures 
along with any risk-reducing instruments, such as netting provi-
sions, collateral, or credit default swaps. The key categories in 
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secured lending, such as deposit holdings, overnight loans, and 
loan commitments.1   
The Riksbank calculates each bank’s net exposure to each of 
its 15 largest counterparties and then compares these numbers to 
the bank’s Tier 1 capital. In testing for contagion risk, the Riks-
bank assumes a major bank defaults on its payments with only a 
25 percent recovery rate. The resulting losses are deducted from 
capital at the other banks to see if they would still have sufficient 
capital or, in the extreme, pose further contagion risks. The chart 
below shows the projected Tier 1 capital ratio at the Swedish bank 
with the least capital remaining after this test.
Chart 1
THE  MAJOR  BANK  WITH  THE  LOWEST  TIER  1   
CAPITAL  RATIO  AFTER  ANOTHER  MAJOR  BANK 
DEFAULTED ON PAYMENTS
1999-2007 (The Tier 1 capital ratio is in percentage terms.)
Source: The Riksbank
The  quarterly  data  provide  helpful  insights  into  the  risk 
exposures that major Swedish banks have to each other and to 
other parties. Allowances must be made because counterparty 
exposures can change very rapidly, and such exposures can be 
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reducing features.2 Moreover, outcomes in a crisis may be much 
different than in normal times, especially if there is a second wave 
of failures. 
ENDNOTES
1For more information on how this data is collected, see Financial 
Stability Report 1999:2, Sveriges Riksbank, pp. 36-41; and Financial Sta-
bility Report 2008:2, Sveriges Riksbank, p. 77.
2According to one Riksbank publication, many of these data limita-
tions could be overcome during unstable periods, because the Riksbank and 
the reporting banks now have “routines and definitions for being able to 
produce these figures quickly if a crisis is imminent” (Andersson, p. 16).58  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
The Netherlands: The De Nederlandsche Bank’s Financial Stability Report
The Netherlands has a relatively small European economy and fi-
nancial system, both of which are integrated with other EU countries, 
the UK, and the United States. As a result, the financial crisis in the 
United States and UK hit the Dutch financial system in a similar way 
with only a short time lag. Dutch banks experienced losses on their 
holdings of mortgage-related and other complex securities. Market li-
quidity problems caused Dutch banks to “re-intermediate”—that is, to 
bring back onto their balance sheets securities previously moved off–
balance sheet into special investment vehicles. Thus, funding require-
ments increased, adding stress to liquidity conditions at Dutch banks.
The financial crisis led to bank failures and to the nationalization 
of a significant banking operation in the Netherlands. ABN AMRO, 
the largest Dutch institution, was acquired in 2007 by a consortium 
of Royal Bank of Scotland, Fortis, and Banco Santander. Fortis, a Bel-
gian banking and insurance company, assumed control of ABN AM-
RO’s Dutch operations. In 2008, Fortis suffered significant losses and 
a liquidity run, which required intervention and assistance from the 
Belgian, Dutch, and French governments. The Dutch government ob-
tained full control of all Fortis operations in the Netherlands, including 
those of ABN AMRO. As a result, almost one-third of the Dutch bank-
ing system came under government control.
Risk identification. The De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB) reports 
identified risks to the financial system both leading up to and during 
the crisis. The reports noted higher leverage and interest rate risk in the 
corporate sector and external risks, such as potential foreign exchange 
risks that might arise from a disorderly correction of global trade imbal-
ances or from risks spreading from the U.S. financial system. Reports in 
2006 and 2007 noted that banks were searching for higher yields and 
raising their risk tolerance, causing them to invest in more complex, 
less transparent, and potentially riskier financial instruments. Pointing 
to increasing leverage both within and outside the financial system, 
the March 2007 report suggested that “an abrupt correction . . . in the 
event of, say, a resurgence of risk aversion, could result in serious market 
turbulence.”12 The reports cautioned that the growth of complex and 
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vulnerable to liquidity problems. The reports also identified weaknesses 
in the risk measurement systems in Dutch financial institutions. 
The DNB uses a number of approaches to identify and assess risks. 
It has access to a wide range of data for the household, corporate, and 
Dutch and international financial sectors. The bank uses financial ra-
tios to assess the current condition of financial firms.13 Market-based 
information is frequently used to measure risk to financial firms. For 
example, the September 2008 report uses charts of credit default swap 
spreads and stock prices to show the market’s perception of increasing 
risk to Dutch financial firms.14
Risk evaluation. The primary tool for assessing the potential impact 
of the risks was scenario analysis. The reports used both a “top–down” 
scenario analysis, which was run by the DNB, and a “bottom–up” ap-
proach, in which individual banks were asked to implement and run 
the analysis. The identified risks were used to construct up to four stress 
scenarios.15 The March 2007 report also discussed a bottom-up liquid-
ity scenario run by Dutch banks. This range of scenarios covered the 
primary risks facing the Dutch financial institutions at the time the 
report was prepared.
The scenario analyses performed reasonably well in measuring risks 
to the financial system, although the results appear to have underesti-
mated the full exposures to the banks and the financial system. While the 
scenario results showed that bank earnings and capital declined under 
the adverse scenarios, earnings remained positive and capital was above 
regulatory minimums for most banks, leading to the conclusion that 
the banks were adequately protected. However, bank losses and capital 
declines during the crisis were larger than anticipated in the simulations.
With the benefit of hindsight, it appears that the adverse scenari-
os were not adverse enough and the DNB was aware that its scenario 
analysis might underestimate risk. As noted in the March 2007 report, 
“in the event of a financial crisis, all kinds of second-order effects may 
materialize—resulting from, for example, confidence effects and herd 
behavior—which are difficult to quantify and may be underestimated 
in the hypothetical scenarios.”16 This accurately describes what, in fact, 
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Spain: The Banco de España’s Financial Stability Report
Leading up to the crisis, Spain experienced one of the most substan-
tial economic expansions among all developed countries, coupled with 
significant house price appreciation and increasing debt levels, both in 
the household and the corporate sectors. Consequently, Spain’s output 
and employment growth became increasingly dependent on the real es-
tate sector.
As in Sweden, the initial phase of the financial crisis had a muted 
effect on Spanish banks due to insignificant exposure to U.S. subprime 
or other hard-to-value instruments.17 As the financial crisis worsened in 
late 2008, Spain’s real estate market declined more rapidly, the economy 
slumped into recession, and banks cut back on new lending. Household 
spending declined, and the business sector turned down. Unemploy-
ment rose to 19.3 percent in October 2009, surpassed in the euro area 
only by Latvia.
In response, the Spanish government implemented fiscal stimulus, 
guaranteed deposits and certain debt, and recapitalized institutions. Even 
with these actions, a major bank, Caja Castilla-La Mancha (CCM), was 
taken over by the government in early 2009. Other Spanish banks have 
so far endured the crisis, but considerable challenges remain as GDP is 
forecast to decline further in 2010 and unemployment may worsen. 
Risk identification. Early on, the Spanish FSRs noted many of the 
risks that would later play a role in the crisis. These included global 
imbalances, low risk premiums and interest rates, the effects of chang-
ing risk perceptions on liquidity, and potential problems in certain U.S. 
and UK markets due to complex credit products and housing booms. 
Additional domestic risks identified were rapid growth in lending, espe-
cially in the real estate sector, which was increasingly being funded in 
wholesale markets. As the crisis progressed, these and other risks became 
more pronounced, as evidenced by increases in doubtful asset ratios and 
the deteriorating global and domestic economy.18
Risk evaluation. To evaluate these identified risks, the FSRs mainly 
looked at regulatory data, but also some market data. As a result, the 
data often experienced an inherent time lag, which limited forward–
looking analysis. Unlike the FSRs in some other countries, the Spanish 
reports did not systematically conduct stress testing. Instead, the FSRs 
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These stress tests first occurred in the spring 2007 report, which 
modeled a scenario in which GDP declined for four consecutive quar-
ters at a similar magnitude as that of Spain’s 1993 recession. The results 
indicated that the doubtful asset ratio at the end of 2007 would stay 
well below 1993 levels. Other stress tests looked at bank credit expo-
sures to corporations, the ability of depository institutions to operate in 
a constrained liquidity environment, and the effect on bonds and loans 
of a severely adverse scenario reflecting house price declines and selected 
default probabilities. All tests found that Spanish depository institu-
tions would be able to withstand the turmoil.
Evaluation of Financial Stability Reports
FSRs are a useful and publicly available surveillance tool. The re-
ports, for instance, can provide a systematic approach to tracking such 
key factors as household and corporate debt and income levels, hous-
ing and property prices, and various risk exposures across the financial 
system. The reports also can supply information about risks and poten-
tial problems that should give central banks, regulatory authorities, and 
financial institutions a better understanding of the financial environ-
ment. The information in FSRs can thus be a necessary precondition 
for preventing or responding to a financial crisis. 
The FSRs reviewed in this analysis performed well in identifying 
the risks that led to the crisis. The reports noted that risk premiums 
for many assets were below historical norms, and banks were searching 
for higher yield and increasing their leverage. The FSRs indicated that 
an abrupt change in market sentiments could lead to disruptions and 
liquidity problems. Several of the FSRs spotlighted a number of unsus-
tainable financial and economic trends.
Evaluating the magnitude of the risks and their effects on the fi-
nancial system was a greater challenge. It is difficult to strike the right 
balance in projecting the magnitude and likelihood of many risks, and 
FSRs should be careful not to overestimate risks. However, the FSRs we 
reviewed underestimated the severity of many of the risks they identi-
fied and the resulting problems during the crisis. As noted in the Oc-
tober 2007 UK FSR, “the speed, force and breadth with which these 
risks combined was not fully anticipated by the authorities or market 
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unprecedented severity of the crisis and the fact that much of the crisis 
originated from events outside of these countries. With new financial 
instruments and interconnected markets, market dynamics are becom-
ing more difficult to predict, and shocks have a more rapid sequence 
(Andersson). 
Even though knowledge gained from the FSRs did not appear to 
significantly reduce the damage of the crisis, it would be a mistake to 
dismiss them as a useful tool. In some cases, FSRs gave authorities a 
better understanding of the resilience of the financial system and policy 
approaches that would be appropriate.
FSRs would have been more useful in the recent crisis if regulatory 
authorities and financial institutions had responded more vigorously to 
the identified risks. Governor Stefan Ingves of the Riksbank noted that 
the bank issued “repeated warning about the development of risks in 
Baltic countries and the fact that risk was priced too low in the finan-
cial markets. Unfortunately, our warnings in these cases were not suf-
ficiently acted upon” (Ingves). It is always difficult to know if or when 
risks and potential problems might be realized. In the recent crisis, 
responses might have been more energetic if the FSRs had fully antici-
pated the magnitudes of the potential problems and financial institu-
tions and regulatory authorities—whether within the central bank or 
outside of it—had taken aggressive steps to control the identified risk 
exposures. An important challenge for many countries will be to take 
the knowledge gained in this crisis and put the information from FSRs 
to better use prior to the next potential financial disruption. This may 
allow FSRs to provide a critical basis for macroprudential supervision.
IV.   CONCLUSIONS
The  recent  financial  crisis  has  renewed  interest  in  proposals  to 
strengthen the U.S. regulatory environment and improve the stability of 
the financial system. This article looked at FSRs as a tool for promoting 
financial stability. FSRs can improve stability when they provide infor-
mation that allows the central bank, other regulatory authorities, and 
market participants to understand potential problems and threats to the 
system and take actions to prevent them. In the event a financial crisis 
occurs, FSRs may also be useful in helping public authorities identify 
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 In this analysis, we assessed whether the reports prepared by the 
UK, Sweden, the Netherlands, and Spain provided useful information 
before and during the crisis. Our general findings were that the FSRs 
in these countries were successful in identifying the risks that led to the 
financial crisis although they underestimated the effects. During the 
crisis, FSRs may have given the central banks a better understanding of 
the resiliency of markets and institutions in their own countries and the 
types of responses needed as the crisis continued.
Overall, preparing FSRs appears to be a worthwhile exercise that 
encourages central banks and international authorities to identify and 
monitor important financial trends and emerging risks and to develop 
a better understanding of the underlying structure of domestic and 
global financial markets. Thus, if FSRs had been used in the U.S., it is 
conceivable that they could have provided a more focused and compre-
hensive look at the risks and market imbalances that led up to the re-
cent crisis. At their best, FSRs might also have given a clearer picture of 
the channels through which this crisis was transmitted across markets 
and on a global basis. At the same time, these reports would likely have 
suffered from some of the same limitations and shortcomings found in 
other countries. Overall, though, FSRs appear to merit consideration 
in any proposal designed to enhance financial stability in the U.S.64  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
APPENDIX 
 
STRUCTURE OF FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORTS IN THE 
UNITED KINGDOM, SWEDEN, NETHERLANDS, AND SPAIN
Financial Stability Reports in the United Kingdom
The key goal of the Bank of England’s FSRs is to identify risks to 
the UK financial system and bring about a better understanding, evalu-
ation, communication, and mitigation of these risks. The focus of the 
FSRs and their analysis is mainly on the financial system as a whole, 
as opposed to individual institutions. This includes not only the major 
UK banks, but also the markets and the infrastructures. A shock to any 
of these functions is assumed to have a greater systemic impact on the 
UK financial system compared to other sectors. 
The Bank of England’s FSRs generally consist of four sections. The 
first section reviews developments in the global financial system since 
the previous report and their impact on risks to the UK economy. The 
second section analyzes how the developments feed through to the UK 
financial system. The third section assesses the resilience of the UK 
financial system. Lastly, section four discusses actions required from 
market participants, public authorities, and at the international level to 
mitigate the risks in the system. 
The UK’s FSRs have developed and grown in content as the fi-
nancial turmoil expanded. Not surprisingly, the reports evolved from a 
more domestic focus to a broader view of the risks in the global finan-
cial sector. The stress testing also evolved and grew in importance, both 
in the reports and at individual institutions. The reports conducted sys-
temic stress tests of the financial system against highly unlikely severe 
shocks throughout much of the crisis. 
The reports extensively use market data, data from financial institu-
tions, and market surveys. In addition, the UK’s Financial Services Au-
thority collects quarterly data on counterparty exposures among large 
financial institutions, and this information, is presented in the FSRs.
Financial Stability Reports in Sweden
In 1997, the Sveriges Riksbank became the first central bank to 
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grew out of the Swedish banking crisis and real estate collapse of the 
early 1990s and the realization that policymakers must do a better job 
of identifying the risks in the financial sector and addressing threats to 
financial stability. In this regard, the forward to recent Swedish FSRs 
states that “An ongoing analysis of stability provides possibilities for the 
early detection of changes and vulnerabilities that together can lead to 
a serious crisis,” and “A thorough analysis also facilitates the manage-
ment of a crisis if one were to occur.”  To incorporate the reports into 
central bank thought and policy, the Executive Board of the Riksbank 
now discusses each new report at its meetings.
The Riksbank’s FSR has evolved to a fairly consistent format, be-
ginning with a summary statement of the report’s overall stability as-
sessment and a summary of the risks in financial markets. The main 
part of the report consists of a review of the condition, risk, and pros-
pects of different borrower groups at Swedish banks—the household 
sector, corporate sector, commercial property market, and foreign bor-
rowers; an analysis of profitability at Swedish banks and their credit, 
liquidity, and contagion risks; and occasional articles on special topics. 
With the globalization of finance and the manner in which the cur-
rent crisis spread across countries, the report pays increasing attention 
to economic and financial developments in other countries and their 
implications for the Swedish financial system.
In assessing the prospects and credit risk of the different borrower 
groups, the report examines such factors as trends in various debt ratios 
by sector, changes in house and commercial property values, and his-
tory of borrower incomes, defaults, and other relevant statistics. The 
Riksbank also conducts a number of stress tests on household debt 
servicing ability, including how rising unemployment or higher interest 
rates might affect the outcome.
Since the four major banks in Sweden have controlled 75 percent 
to 80 percent of the Swedish public’s deposits and borrowings in recent 
years, the banking section in the FSR focuses largely on the profit-
ability and risk exposures of these four banks. A number of stress tests 
are made in the reports with respect to each bank’s resilience to vari-
ous risks, including domestic credit risk, foreign lending risk, liquidity 
risk that might arise from an increase in funding costs, and contagion 
risk as measured by the banks’ counterparty exposures to each other. 66  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
During the crisis, the Riksbank performed several credit risk stress tests, 
including one scenario based on expected loan losses and a more severe 
scenario incorporating notably higher loan losses.
The Riksbank makes use of a variety of data sources in its FSR. 
These include a risk survey of participants in the Swedish fixed income 
and foreign exchange markets, an annual household finance survey sup-
plemented by individual tax filings, external measures of credit quality, 
and quarterly reports to the Riksbank from the four major banks on 
their 15 largest counterparty exposures to each other.
Financial Stability Reports in the Netherlands
De Nederlandsche Bank is the national bank of the Netherlands. 
On a semiannual basis, it publishes its financial stability report “Over-
view of Financial Stability in the Netherlands.”  The reports review the 
current economic and financial conditions and assess the potential risks 
facing Dutch banks, insurance companies, and pension funds.
Dutch FSRs follow a standard format. The introduction gives a brief 
overview of the report and provides an assessment of the stability of the 
Dutch financial system. The second section reviews developments in the 
international economic and financial environment, highlighting aspects 
that generate risks for Dutch institutions. The next section reviews the 
corporate and household sectors of the Dutch economy, looking for im-
balances and weaknesses that may lead to problems for the economy or 
the financial system. The fourth section reviews the financial condition 
of the banking, insurance, and pension sectors and identifies weaknesses 
and risks that could lead to systemic problems. The financial infrastruc-
ture is reviewed in the fifth section. This section looks at the payments 
system, securities and derivatives settlement systems, and risk manage-
ment practices of financial firms. A concluding section of the report 
provides a summary.
To identify and assess risks to the financial sector, De Nederlandsche 
Bank uses data on the household, corporate, and Dutch and international 
financial sectors and also analyzes financial ratios to ascertain the condi-
tion of financial firms. The Dutch central bank further uses a scenario 
analysis or set of stress tests to measure the possible effects of the identified 
risks on financial institutions and financial stability. The central bank uses 
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also has asked major banks to run their own liquidity tests and other risk 
assessments. De Nederlandsche Bank’s tests have included such scenarios 
as economic stagnation, disruptions from global imbalances, substantial 
dollar depreciation, and significant drops in housing prices.
Financial Stability Reports in Spain
Spain publishes a semiannual FSR with the goal of promoting fi-
nancial stability and communicating the trends and risks seen in the 
financial system to the financial sector and, to a lesser extent, the public. 
A further rationale behind these FSRs is that the identified risks could 
possibly be mitigated if the reports adopt an effective and forward-look-
ing approach. 
The structure of the Spanish report, which has not changed signifi-
cantly over time, is mainly built around the banking system. Though 
other financial market participants, such as insurance companies, pen-
sion funds, mutual funds, etc., are discussed in the FSRs, they are ana-
lyzed on a much smaller scale. The core part, the depository institutions, 
is divided into three banking parts: risks, profitability, and solvency. In 
all sections, the reports generally look at consolidated data. However, 
the FSRs include some distributional calculations to provide a more 
individualistic look at bank behavior. 
The banking risk section uses a consolidated balance sheet analysis 
generally focused on bank lending to households and corporations. This 
section also looks at doubtful assets, loan loss provisions, loan defaults, 
and funding issues. Since the continued profitability of banks is cen-
tral to coping with financial instability, the Spanish reports examine the 
consolidated income statements of depository institutions and various 
financial ratios, such as returns on assets, returns on equity, and effi-
ciency ratios. In this profitability section, a number of market indica-
tors, including CDS spreads and equity prices for Spanish banks, are 
analyzed and compared to other countries’ banks. The solvency section 
focuses on the capitalization of the banks and looks at such indicators as 
solvency ratios and Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital ratios. 
As the crisis unfolded, the FSRs added a section reviewing macro-
economic and international issues. Further, the reports generally con-
tain additional sections on such topics as changes in policy, regulation, 
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ENDNOTES
1This study will focus on FSRs published by central banks in individual 
countries. However, FSRs are published also by the International Monetary Fund 
and the European Central Bank. For example, see International Monetary Fund, 
“Global Financial Stability Report, Navigating the Financial Challenges Ahead,” 
October 2009; and European Central Bank, “Financial Stability Review,” De-
cember 2009.
2In general, these are not publicly available. One exception was the Supervi-
sory Capital Assessment Program, where U.S. regulatory agencies estimated fu-
ture capital levels for the 19 largest banking organizations under scenarios that 
included significant declines in economic conditions. The results were released 
publicly in April 2009.
3Sander Oosterloo, et al., page 338.
4Bank of England, Financial Stability Report, December 2009, page 5.
5The  ECB  website  (http://www.ecb.int/pub/fsr/html/index.en.html)  defines  fi-
nancial stability “as a condition in which the financial system—comprising of finan-
cial intermediaries, markets and market infrastructures—is capable of withstanding 
shocks, thereby reducing the likelihood of disruptions in the financial intermedia-
tion process which are severe enough to significantly impair the allocation of sav-
ings to profitable investment opportunities.”  The Oesterreichische Nationalbank, 
Austria’s central bank (http://www.oenb.at/en/finanzm_stab/–finanzmarktstabilitaet/–
finanzmarktstabilitaet.jsp#tcm:16-1060) notes that “financial stability refers to a 
situation in which the financial markets fulfill their allocation function in a satisfac-
tory manner, even in the case of shocks.”
6Activities that create risks for the individual financial institution and for the 
financial system may lead to an under–provision of risk abatement. The financial 
institution has incentives to reduce its own risk exposures, but not the system-
level exposures, since it does not face these risks directly. Economists refer to risks 
like these systemic risks (those not faced directly by individual institutions) as 
externalities. Externalities can lead to a less than socially optimal level of risk or 
cost abatement.
Supervision of financial institutions is also subject to problems with exter-
nalities. Currently, most supervisory oversight is focused on risk exposures within 
individual institutions. The recent financial crisis, though, has prompted much 
discussion on how public authorities should expand their focus to the overall level 
of risk–taking in financial markets through “macroprudential supervision.”
7For example, central banks with responsibility for supervising financial insti-
tutions are generally unable to publish surveillance reports based on confidential 
examination findings or other confidential supervisory correspondence.
8Oosterloo, et al., looked at the use of financial soundness indicators across a 
large number of FSRs.ECONOMIC REVIEW • FIRST QUARTER 2010  69
9Bank of England, Financial Stability Report, April 2007, p. 10.
10Serious housing problems were avoided in Sweden due to little over–build-
ing, almost no lending to households with poor credit histories, the important 
role Swedish banks play in holding mortgages and controlling their credit risk, 
and the fact that Swedish households remain liable for any remaining mortgage 
debt even after foreclosure.
11The first 2006 FSR has an article which describes how the Riksbank uses 
external information and a portfolio model to measure credit risk and expected 
losses at Sweden’s four largest banks (see pages 75-88 of this report). The follow-
ing FSRs describe the assumptions and calculations used in each of the credit 
quality scenarios. 
12De Nederlandsche Bank, “Overview of Financial Stability in the Nether-
lands,” March 2007, No. 5, p 4.
13Although not referenced in the OFS reports, the DNB posts on its web-
site a spreadsheet with the current and historical financial stability indicators, 
both core and supplemental, suggested by the IMF (www.statistics.dnb.nl/index.
cgi?lang=uk&todo=fs).
14De Nederlandsche Bank, “Overview of Financial Stability in the Nether-
lands,” September 2008, pp. 5, 6.
15For example, the March 2007 OFS report included the results of three top 
down scenarios: a “malaise” scenario, a “global correction” scenario, and a “housing 
market correction” scenario. The malaise scenario incorporated economic stagna-
tion and falling bond yields. The global correction scenario assumed disorderly cor-
rection of global imbalances, sharply rising bond yields, and substantial dollar de-
preciation. The housing market correction scenario included an initial rise in bond 
yields, a 30 percent drop in housing prices over three years leading to a slowdown in 
economic growth, and falling interest rates and equity markets. The scenarios were 
run using the DNB’s MORKMON econometric forecasting model. 
16De Nederlandsche Bank, “Overview of Financial Stability in the Nether-
lands,” March 2007, p. 13.
17Additionally, the securitization process in Spain differed from that in the 
United States. Spanish banks, for instance, retained a large portion of credit risk 
on their books and used securitization primarily as a means of obtaining funding.
18Doubtful assets “are considered unlikely to be fully or partially repaid on 
the contractually agreed terms, either due to customer arrears or for other reasons 
(if the institution has reasonable doubts regarding their recovery),” Banco de Es-
paña, Financial Stability Report, Spring 2006, p. 88.
19Bank of England, Financial Stability Report, October 2007, p. 40.70  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
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